Economic and Political Cooperation between India and East Asia: The Emerging Perspective by Chakraborty, Anushree & Chakraborty, Debashis
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Economic and Political Cooperation
between India and East Asia: The
Emerging Perspective
Anushree Chakraborty and Debashis Chakraborty
Vidyasagar College for Women, Kolkata, Indian Institute of Foreign
Trade, New Delhi
20 April 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78676/
MPRA Paper No. 78676, posted 21 April 2017 07:40 UTC
Economic and Political Cooperation between India and East Asia:  
The Emerging Perspective# 
 
Anushree Chakraborty1 and Debashis Chakraborty2*  
 
1 Assistant Professor, Vidyasagar College for Women, Kolkata, bhattacharyya.anushree@gmail.com  
2 Assistant Professor, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, debchakra@gmail.com and 
corresponding author 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After initiating the economic liberalization policies in 1991, India adopted a ‘Look East 
Policy’ (LEP) with the dual objective of securing economic growth and maintaining maritime 
security. Cooperation with East Asia received further boost, when the ‘Act East Policy’ (AEP) 
came into effect during the maiden visit of Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi at the ASEAN-
India Summit in 2014, which emphasizes on practicing more action-oriented policy towards 
ASEAN and the wider East Asia. As a result of the policy shift and through the other initiatives 
like Make-in-India, India’s trade and investment linkages with East Asia is on the rise. In 2015, 
the Prime Minister visited five East Asian countries at various occasions. There have been other 
high level diplomatic visits to the East, followed by the appropriate diplomatic channels. 
Therefore, AEP has brought a great sense of speed and priority in engaging with the East and 
Southeast Asian countries. On maritime front, China’s nine-dash line doctrine generated strategic 
concerns both in East and Southeast Asia and India has emerged as a strategic player in the 
region through joint naval exercises and capacity buildings with partner countries. Given the 
recent reservations expressed by Beijing against the ruling by the international tribunal in The 
Hague, India’s maritime security initiatives in East Asia is likely stay relevant in coming days. 
The current paper examines the future for India-East Asia relations in days to come, especially in 
the current geo-political set-up.  
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Economic and Political Cooperation between India and East Asia:  
The Emerging Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After initiating the economic liberalization programme in 1991, India adopted a ‘Look East 
Policy’ (LEP) with an economic objective in mind. The ‘East’ in the Indian policy frame covered 
economies located in Southeast and East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. While on one hand, 
Australia, Japan, Singapore and South Korea were considered as potential source of technology 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), several high growth economies from the region (e.g., 
ASEAN members, China, Japan) were considered as potential export markets. India’s growing 
engagement with ASEAN, resulting into the free trade agreement (FTA) in 2010, the 
comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA) with Japan and South Korea and the 
comprehensive economic cooperation agreements (CECA) with Singapore and Malaysia, are the 
cases in point. In addition, given the geopolitical developments, India in the recent period has 
emerged as a counterbalance for maintaining maritime security in the Southeast and East Asia.  
 
Under the current Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, India’s diplomatic relations with the 
East Asian countries is undergoing through significant evolutions in terms of depth and breadth, 
despite the continuity in the primary objectives. For instance, one of the prime objectives of the 
National Common Minimum Programme (2004) announced earlier has been to deepen trade and 
investment ties with China and other East Asian partners. The Prime Minister launched the ‘Act 
East Policy’ (AEP) at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. With the change in 
nomenclature from LEP to AEP, the focus of the foreign policy has significantly expanded its 
geographical coverage beyond Southeast Asia and the existing East Asian partners (i.e., Japan 
and South Korea) to include countries like Australia, Pacific Island nations and Mongolia. 
 
India presently shares cordial relations with South Korea, while Japan is already a major 
strategic partner. However, with its’ immediate East Asian neighbor, China, it is maintaining the 
delicate balancing act, because the ‘dragon’ is the principal strategic rival in the broader Indo-
Pacific strategic milieu. Therefore, diversity of engagement within the region is ostensible. In 
addition, the apparent conflicting interests among these East Asian countries in terms of broader 
strategic and maritime security present a major challenge for India. But at the same time, the 
region offers lucrative trade and investment opportunities for a rising developing country like 
India. As a result, East Asia draws major foreign policy attention for New Delhi wherein the 
policymakers need to effectively walk the delicate tight rope.  
 
It is observed that Southeast Asia is increasingly holding a special place in India’s economic 
and geostrategic considerations (Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 2014). However, a major 
concern is whether India’s cooperation with ASEAN can be deepened further, especially in the 
light of China’s growing integration with these economies in the aftermath of the Sino-ASEAN 
FTA (Chakraborty and Kumar, 2012). Conversely, given China’s increasingly complex relation 
with the Asia-Pacific, there is a need to understand India’s opportunities in these quarters. The 
current paper examines the opportunities that the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government narratives, which came to office in 2014, are expected to add in India-East Asia 
relations, given the current geo-political set-up. First, the political cooperation potentials are 
analyzed for key East Asian countries, namely, China, Japan and the Koreas from an Indian 
perspective. This is followed by a narrative on extent of economic partnership with the ‘East’. 
On the basis of the deliberations, it attempts to seek answers to India’s drive towards greater 
linkages with this Asian sub-region, both in economic and strategic platforms. 
 
2. Political Cooperation with East Asia: Engagement beyond ASEAN  
 
India has subsequently strengthened the ties with the ‘East’ by becoming Sectoral Dialogue 
Partner of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1992, covering trade, tourism, 
investment and science and technology. It has started to cooperate in other areas, namely joint 
naval exercises (e.g., Singapore), gathering support for its Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid 
(e.g. Australia), developing strategic partnership and energy cooperation (e.g., Mongolia) with 
other countries in recent years. The cooperation and the concerns with select East Asian 
countries are noted in the following.  
 
2.1 Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) 
 
India shares diplomatic relations with both South and North Korea. New Delhi has been 
unequivocal in its support for ‘reunification of Korea’. However, India’s diplomatic relations 
with two the Koreas swerve significantly.  
 
With North Korea, political cooperation is limited in nature given India’s strong resentment 
against its nuclear proliferation record. For example, when North Korea conducted a nuclear test 
in 2009, India promptly voiced its concerns. Indeed it’s fifth and largest yet test in September 
2016, brought strong reaction from New Delhi. The Indian government abides by the UN 
sanctions imposed on this reclusive Communist country. Given the delicate nature of its relations 
with Pakistan, India has been one of the staunchest critics on ‘nuclear technology exchange 
between North Korea and Pakistan’, in the aftermath of exposure on established illegal nuclear 
trading carried by AQ Khan Network. Moreover, North Korea’s close proximity to Pakistan and 
China and its explicit support towards Pakistan on the Kashmir conflict does not help to build 
goodwill either. Nevertheless, India’s policy towards North Korea, reflects pragmatism or rather 
an investment for the future. Considering North Korea as one of the trusted and tested ally of 
China, India is careful enough to cooperate on humanitarian ground, thereby resisting North 
Korea’s absolute dependence on Beijing.   
 
Both New Delhi and Pyongyang have maintained embassies and their political and economic 
cooperation is no less trivial. India is one of North Korea’s major trade partners as well as a 
major food aid provider. Increasing number of North Koreans are receiving scientific and 
computer training in India, creating a mechanism for civilian interactions. As Ministry of 
External Affairs Annual Report (2015-16) states, India continued to allocate ITEC slots to DPRK 
nationals to assist its capacity building efforts, offering 15 slots for the year 2015-16. Their 
cooperation is visible in the United Nations and other international fora. For instance, DPRK has 
supported India’s candidature at United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for 2015-
2017; Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage for 
2014-2018; and the post of Secretary General of Asia Pacific Tele-community for 2015-2018 
(GoI, 2015a). 
 
India has deepened its political and diplomatic engagement with Republic of Korea (i.e., 
South Korea) over the decades. The discussions between the Indian Prime Minister and former 
South Korean President Park Gyun-hye on the margin of the 14th India-ASEAN Summit and the 
11th East Asia Summit in Vientiane on 8th September 2016 highlights that the AEP pertains to 
active engagements with countries beyond ASEAN (HT, 2016a). India- RoK relationship was 
elevated to the level of ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ during the State Visit of Prime Minister 
Modi to South Korea during 18-19 May 2015. This suggests that despite the strong economic 
undercurrents, South Korea’s relation with India is not simply based on investor-driven relations.  
 
During former President Park’s four-day state visit on January 2014, the agreed upon strategic 
agenda included - stronger high level political cooperation, freer economic and trade 
environment and deeper cultural understanding (GoI, 2014a). The defense and security 
relationship between the two countries was boosted with the Agreement on the Protection of 
Classified Military Information and the MoU on Joint applied research as Partnership between 
the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Defense Acquisition and 
Program Administration (DAPA) is also deepening (GoI, 2014b). Since both the countries are 
members of East Asia Summit, therefore they share common interest in maintaining stability and 
prosperity in East Asia. Although the potential in bilateral relations between South Korea and 
India has not been fully explored, nevertheless there is deep understanding between the two 
countries as reflected in South Korea’s non-intrusive stand towards India’s food aid supply to its 
troubled neighbor, North Korea. In addition, the country has supported India in its recent bid to 
NSG membership.  
 
2.2 Japan 
 
The Indian Prime Minister visited Japan in 2014 and again in November 2016. The 2014 visit 
was his first overseas visit outside the neighbourhood. Both India and Japan, the two major 
Asian powers, one being the largest and another being the oldest democracies in Asia, share 
common cultural traditions including the heritage of Buddhism, and committed to the ideals of 
democracy, tolerance, pluralism and open society (GoI, 2015c). The strategic aspirations of the 
two countries (e.g., UN Security Council bid) are also similar. Also, there has never been any 
ideological, cultural or territorial disputes between the countries (GoI, 2015b). Although the 
present bonhomie was absent during the Cold War decades, Japan helped India to recover from 
the 1991 balance of payment instability (GoI, undated). The uncomfortable moments following 
the second Pokhran test in 1998 did not significantly influence the bilateral relationship. As a 
result, India is currently seeking opportunity from Japan in training 30,000 Indian youth in the 
Japanese styled manufacturing over the next 10 years, which will significantly aid the recent 
‘Make in India’ and ‘Skill India’ process (GoI, 2016). The Indo-Japanese relations further 
deepened through collaborating on science and technology, covering a wide range of areas viz., 
marine and earth science, agriculture and food industries, protecting Geographical Indication 
(GI) of agriculture products etc. (ET, 2016).  
 
The 21st century brought the two Asian giants even closer given the strategic imperative with 
the rise of China. Indo-Pacific strategic equation in the ongoing period prepared the ground for a 
qualitative shift in bilateral relations. For instance, with the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) from Japan, New Delhi appreciated the culmination of ‘Japan-India Global Partnership in 
the 21st century’, which was launched following Japanese Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India in 
2000 (GoI, undated). Their bilateral ties elevated further with Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. 
Shinzo Abe was invited to be the Chief Guest at India's 2014 Republic Day parade, enabling 
both the countries to take the opportunity to establish ‘Special Strategic Global Partnership’ 
between them. The six rounds of talks between Indian Navy and JMSDF Staff and the joint naval 
exercise named Malabar 2016 involving India, Japan and the US are the cases in point. In 2016 
visit, PM Modi signed ten agreements, including Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy (IE, 2016).  
 
Notably, India-Japan ties are complementary since India offers huge market for Japan, while 
Japan intends to ‘develop and strengthen reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures that 
augment connectivity within India and between India and other countries in the region’ (GoI, 
2015c). Both the countries hold similar position in South China Sea and have significant stake in 
the stability of Southeast Asian and East Asian maritime contour. India and Japan are also 
moving forward with trilateral Senior Official Talks involving Australia, at the Foreign Secretary 
level (Lang, 2015). The first such meeting was held in Delhi on 8 June 2015. In addition, Japan 
supports India in its NSG bid. Therefore, in the coming years, India-Japan bilateral relation is 
likely to strengthen further. 
 
2.3 China 
 
Despite PM Modi’s personal interest in resolving differences with China, India-China 
relations during the NDA regime is yet to witness significant improvements. In 2016, there were 
several high level visits between the two countries (GoI, 2017). The two countries show a high 
degree of similarity in terms of inclination towards energy consumption, growth rate and ability 
to influence policies beyond their territories (Madan, 2015). 
 
Both India and China have indeed cooperated in various forums, e.g., environmental 
challenges, economic infrastructure (e.g., the New Development Bank formed though BRICS). 
On the other hand, complex questions like their disputed border, the Chinese standpoint on 
accepting Arunachal Pradesh as integral part of India, the concern over Tibet (e.g., the presence 
of His Holiness, the 14th Dalai Lama in India and his visit to Arunachal Pradesh), management of 
river basins and water flows, growing Chinese influence and infrastructure initiatives in South 
Asia (e.g., especially its close relationship with Pakistan and the construction of the China-
Pakistan Friendship Highway through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), as well as Chinese 
reservations on India’s involvement in its neighbourhood (e.g., oil exploration by Indian entities 
in South China Sea) are some of prickling issues (Chakraborty, 2014; Madan, 2015). The two 
Asian neighbours share an extremely competitive equation, suggesting serious geo-strategic 
rivalry, where both seek to contain each other’s influence. The best recent example include, 
China’s reluctance towards endorsement of India’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
and its objections to India’s membership in the NSG (Rajagopalan and Biswas, 2016). In 
addition, it has intervened on behalf of its’ all weather friend Pakistan, to obstruct India’s bid at 
the UN, ‘to declare Masood Azhar a terrorist’ (HT, 2016b).  
 
China’s recent drive to construct key roads and ports in South Asia can be considered as a 
move to encircle India through the ‘String of Pearls’ (Bhattacharyya and Chakraborty, 2011). 
The Chinese ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) strategy is now aspiring to create a deep connectivity 
linkage with several regions (Kumar, 2016). India’s recent assistance to countries like Myanmar, 
Vietnam, some of the Indian Ocean island countries and African countries, can be considered as 
counterbalance to China’s increasing presence in these countries. India’s proximity to the US in 
recent period is not likely to smoothen the thorny patches of the two Asian giants. In short, the 
relationship between the two countries has elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, 
conflict (Madan, 2015). As India is expected to establish closer ties with Japan and the US in 
coming days, it will continue to look for opportunities for cooperation (particularly economic), 
reduce asymmetries, manage competition, and deter conflict, since both the countries’ leader 
seek ‘Asia for Asians’ in the long run (Madan, 2015). It has however been observed at the 
recently concluded BRICS summit at Goa in October 2016 that the China is not likely to come to 
an accord with Indian standpoints, including the ways to counter terrorism, too soon (Swami, 
2016).  
 
2.4 Multilateral Forum: East Asian Summit 
 
Bilateral relations with the East Asian countries are not indicative enough to comprehend the 
depth of India’s ties with East Asia, as a region. Despite the diversity of relationship India holds 
multilateral engagement with the countries of this region, through East Asia Summit (EAS), 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). These platforms provide India alternative space to 
synergize its common interests with the partners. There are several non-traditional security 
concerns that could bring India closer to the East Asian countries along with the ASEAN 
members. For example, India participated in EAS activities in 2015 by co-hosting the 4th EAS 
Workshop on the Regional Security Architecture along with Cambodia in Phnom Penh in July 
2015. To further the development agenda under the EAS, India organized an ‘EAS Roundtable 
on Nursing and Trauma Care’ at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi during 
15-16 October 2015 and an ‘EAS Conference on Maritime Security and Cooperation’ at the 
ASEAN-India Centre on 8-9 November 2015 (GoI, 2015a).The expansionist approach of China, 
especially its construction of artificial islands in South China Sea, is further strengthening India’s 
position in the region (Chakraborty, 2014; Roy Chaudhury, 2016).  
 
3. Economic Cooperation with East Asia  
 
3.1 Trade Integration Scenario 
 
India’s seriousness in partnering Southeast and East Asian countries through the LEP is 
evident from the fact that more than 80 percent of its preferential trade agreements are 
concentrated in these regions. Among the operational FTAs, Bangkok Agreement (1976), India-
Singapore (2005) and India-Malaysia (2011) CECAs, India-South Korea (2010) and India-Japan 
(2011) CEPAs and India-ASEAN FTA (2010) deserve mention. The ongoing discussions on 
BIMSTEC FTA, India-Indonesia, India–New Zealand and India–Thailand CECAs, Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) etc. are expected to expand India’s trade-
investment linkages to the ‘East’ further (Chaisse et al., 2011). In particular, the growing Indian 
interest in crafting CEPAs and CEPAs rather than FTAs with partners indicate the country’s 
inclination towards service export and inward investment (and associated technology transfer) 
facilitation. In this context RCEP, the trade agreement encompassing ASEAN and six of its FTA 
partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea), is expected to create 
not only a growing market for Indian exports but also form the core of a significant long-run 
economic partnership through deepening of integration in international production networks 
(IPNs) and value chains (Das and Dubey, 2014). However, RCEP negotiations have already 
missed its 2015 deadline and the lack of cohesion and structural similarity among partners, 
fueled by undercurrent of political and strategic considerations is expected to delay the 
negotiations further (NEAT India, 2014). 
 
There is a need to understand whether it will be possible for India to fast-track the trade 
liberalization process with the AEP target countries. The possible challenges can be tracked by 
looking at the evolving bilateral trade balance scenario, i.e., export-import gap. In Table 1, 
India’s merchandise trade scenario with Southeast and East Asia over 2001-14 has been 
summarized. For understanding the evolving trade pattern, the entire period is divided in three 
sub-periods, namely, 2001-05, 2006-10 and 2011-14. In addition to the figures for a few 
constituent members, the scenario for ASEAN is reported as a group. A couple of interesting 
observations emerge from the table. First, Indian trade balance is consistently in surplus only 
with respect to seven partners – Cambodia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam among ASEAN 
members and Hong Kong, North Korea, Mongolia in East Asia. The presence of a number of 
smaller economies in this set requires deeper introspection. The worrying fact is that the deficit is 
rising in the post-2011 period, despite India’s trade agreements with the countries. Second, India 
is having a negative trade balance with all the ‘comprehensive’ trade partners (i.e., Japan, 
Malaysia and South Korea), barring the exception of Singapore, which is not a major ‘producer’ 
for several merchandise product categories. In other words, the inclusion of services, trade and 
investment provisions have not improved India’s merchandise trade balance so far, through the 
much-expected technology spillover effect. It deserves mention that while the CECA negotiation 
with Indonesia is going on, the trade balances are worsening. Third, vis-à-vis ASEAN partners, 
India is having trade surplus only with Cambodia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. Trade 
deficit with all the other six countries is widening over the period, underlining that India’s 
market penetration has remained narrow so far. There is a growing need to conduct a detailed 
analysis for identifying competitiveness of Indian exports vis-à-vis the ASEAN partners, 
particularly in the light of the tariff and non-tariff barriers in the ASEAN market on India. 
Finally, it can be observed that India’s trade deficit with respect to the proposed RCEP members, 
i.e., the five bilateral FTA partners of ASEAN, is widening particularly since 2011. The quantum 
of the deficit is particularly high for China, a country which faces a significant number of anti-
dumping investigations in the Indian Market (Chaisse and Chakraborty, 2016a). It may be argued 
that the past experience of moderate export success through tariff reforms in the ‘East’ in general 
and the ASEAN market in particular, is guiding India to tread cautiously at the ongoing RCEP 
negotiations. 
 
3.2 Emergence of Natural Partnership? 
 
In order to analyze the underlying reason behind India’s poorer export performance, the 
bilateral Trade Complementarity Index (TCI) between India and ‘East’ partners are computed 
and summarized in Table 2. TCI indices are calculated by looking at the export pattern of India 
and imports of another country (say, Malaysia) and vice versa. Export and import TCI is reported 
separately for 2005, 2010 and 2015. The higher values of TCI over time indicate increasing 
similarities between export basket of a country (say, India) and import basket of its trade partner 
(say, Malaysia). The TCI is calculated by using the following formula:  
 
 
 
where Xik is share of commodity k in country i’s total exports, and Mjk is share of commodity 
k in country j’s total imports at HS 2-digit level.  
 
Several conclusions emerge from the indices reported in Table 2. First, export TCI for India is 
rising over 2005-15 for all the reported economies, barring the exceptions like North Korea and 
Vietnam. The rise has been substantial for both LDCs (e.g., Cambodia, Lao PDR) as well as 
developing (e.g., Indonesia, Malaysia) and developed (Australia, Singapore) countries. However, 
over 2010-15, the export TCI has declined for major economies like China, Japan and South 
Korea. Second, import TCI for India has generally increased over 2005-15 with partner 
countries, barring exceptions of New Zealand, North Korea and Vietnam. India’s trade 
complementarity with several countries has crossed the mark of 50 in recent past, indicating 
adjustments in export (import) patterns of Southeast and East Asian countries with the import 
(export) pattern of India. However, the TCI values suggests that the convergence of Indo-
ASEAN trade complementarity is occurring at a moderate pace, which is a matter of worry for 
Indian export prospects (Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 2014). 
 
The evolving trade partnership pattern can also be gauzed by looking at Trade Intensity Index 
(TII), which indicates whether two partners are involved more intensely in their bilateral trade 
vis-à-vis their global trade flows. The value of TII above 1 for any given country-pair (say, India 
and New Zealand) indicates that the trade relation is ‘intense’, while a value less than ‘1’ 
indicates otherwise.TII is calculated by the following formulation:  
 
 
 
In the numerator, Xsd refers to the bilateral exports of a given country pair (say, India and 
Japan), while Xsw indicates their global exports. In the denominator, Xwd and Xwy represents 
world’s export to a country pair and to the world respectively. The computed TII indices has 
been taken from ADB ARIC database (ADB, undated). 
 
The summarized TII results in left panel of Table 3 indicates that at the aggregate level India 
is not having an intense trade relationship with most of the reported countries, barring the 
exception of Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Among ASEAN partners, its trade 
relation is intense with Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam. The results indicates that India’s trade 
relationship with a number of developed economies like Japan and South Korea, with whom 
India has already entered into preferential trade agreements, are consistently non-intense. On the 
other hand, the relation is also non-intense with major developing countries, e.g., China, 
Philippines and Thailand. Clearly, the current engagements through regional integration have not 
been able to deepen India’s overall trade flows with the East and Southeast Asian countries.  
 
3.3 Engagement in Production Networks: Sectoral Perspective 
 
The future potential of India’s trade integration with East and Southeast Asian countries can 
be understood from the bilateral ‘intra-industry trade’ (IIT) index, that measures the level of 
trade in intermediate and semi-finished products. The Grubel and Lloyd index of IIT is 
calculated by considering the simultaneous export and import data for any given country-pairs, 
with the following formula:  
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Here Xij and Mij denote the value of export and imports of one country (say, India) from the 
partner (say, Japan) at HS 4-digit level respectively. The IIT index thus calculated could vary 
between 0 and 100. As per construct of the formula, when exports exactly match imports at each 
HS 4-digit classification, it signifies growing IPN relationship and IIT value reaches 100. On the 
other hand, when either of export or import is zero, this implies specialization in both countries 
in complementary sectors and the IIT index takes the value of zero.  
 
It is expected that when two countries enter into FTAs (i.e., resulting into tariff reforms) or a 
trade facilitation agreement (i.e., resulting into procedural reforms), IIT-type trade deepens as 
firms from both countries may engage into trade in parts and components and intermediate 
products across the border to lower cost of business. As several Asian countries have already 
entered into FTAs / CECAs / CEPAs with India, the current analysis reports their bilateral 
overall IITs during 2005, 2010 and 2015. The results are summarized in right panel of Table 3. 
The findings indicate that the IIT between India and the partner countries have increased in 
general, barring the exceptions of Hong Kong, Macao and New Zealand. The rising IIT indicates 
specialization in narrower product lines within product categories, including trade in 
intermediate products and parts and components, that is occurring between India and the ‘East’. 
This in turn enhances the possibility of deepening IPNs with East and Southeast Asia further. 
Among ASEAN countries, India’s IIT with Brunei has declined. Moreover for Singapore, with 
whom India has entered into the CECA in 2005, has consistently witnessed a high level of IIT, 
signifying deep integration within product categories. In addition, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea 
and Thailand witnessed rising IIT level over 2005-2015, indicating deeper production integration 
with inception of the respective trade agreements. On the other hand, though there is no 
comprehensive trade agreement with China, the IIT has remained at a relatively higher level, 
arguable given the geographical proximity and rising complementarities.   
 
While India’s IPN integration with the ‘East’ has deepened, the linkages across value chains 
at the product level needs to be identified. As noted earlier, one of the major expectation for 
India from the integration with ASEAN is to develop a deeper association with the IPNs located 
in these economies. In Tables 2-6, the regional production contribution in five select industries is 
compared over 2000-2011 by drawing data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Trade in Value-Added (TIVA) database on origin of value added in 
gross exports. While exporting a final product, a country may source the necessary raw materials 
and the parts and components either from within the nation or from abroad and undertake the 
necessary value addition on them before export. Rise in the domestic value added content of 
exports (i.e., rise in percentage contribution of a country in own exports) implies strengthening 
of the domestic supplier network (backward integration), while a decline in the same implies that 
the exporters are increasingly relying on the imported raw materials, parts and components and 
service link supports from abroad (Nag, 2016). The latter then indicates deeper integration with 
regional IPNs. The Indian export scenario is compared here with three East Asian economies 
(China, Japan and South Korea), and the source of value addition for their exports in five 
prominent product categories provides interesting insights.  
 
Table 4 shows the scenario for the basic metal and fabricated metal products. It is observed 
that domestic contribution has increased in China, while the same has declined in the other three 
countries. Contribution of OECD and ASEAN countries in total exports have increased for India, 
while integration with China, Japan and South Korea is also on the rise. Conversely, India’s 
share in exports of the three East Asian countries has also increased.  
 
Table 5 indicates the scenario for computer, electronic and optical equipment sector. In this 
case also domestic value addition has increased in China, while the same has declined in the 
other three countries. Contribution of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN and 
OECD countries in total exports have increased for India, and its share exports of the East Asian 
countries has increased deeper. 
 
Table 6 reveals the scenario for electrical machinery and apparatus. Like the experience of 
the other sectors, domestic contribution to exports has increased only in China. Contribution of 
OECD, APEC, ASEAN and the East Asian countries in total exports have increased for India, 
though its presence in the exports of other countries has remained at a relatively moderate level, 
particularly involving South Korea.  
 
Table 7 depicts the scenario for textiles, leather and footwear products. Once again, domestic 
contribution of exports has increased only in China. Contribution of OECD, APEC, ASEAN and 
the East Asian countries in total exports have increased for India. Conversely, India’s presence in 
the exports of other East Asian countries has increased moderately. 
 
Finally, Table 8 summarizes the scenario for the transport equipment sector and barring 
China all countries are witnessing a decline in domestic contribution to exports. Contribution of 
OECD, APEC, ASEAN and the East Asian countries are increasing in Indian exports, but the 
country’s participation in others’ exports is growing slowly.  
 
A couple of general observations can also be drawn from the value addition dynamics 
revealed from Tables 4-8. First, the percentage value contribution of Japan is declining in other 
country’s exports in the selected sectors, while the same for China is generally rising. The 
observation clearly underlines Japan and several Southeast Asian economy’s interest to engage 
India through both security and economic cooperation to counter China. Second, the value 
addition contribution of the EU and US in the export of China is generally going down over 
2000-11 in the selected sectors, while the same for India, Japan and South Korea is on the rise. 
Therefore, the incentive to confront US is increasing for China in the selected merchandise 
product groups, while the other three countries are likely to cooperate with the US. In addition, 
this implies that while China is witnessing production integration within the region, for India the 
value addition from EU-US-OECD economies still hold a significant role for its exports. Finally, 
while the value addition contribution of other ‘East’ economies (e.g., Taiwan, New Zealand) has 
increased in India’s exports, they still remain at low to moderate levels. Therefore, India’s 
coordination with these countries from a pure economic standpoint is not likely to deepen too 
soon.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The discussion indicates that AEP initiated by the NDA government is yet to deliver the 
expected results. However, the current observations provide a wider glimpse to the evolving 
scenario. India’s bid to integrate with the ‘East’ has been quite successful, barring the exception 
of China. While China has pledged to cooperate with India through various forums like the 
BRICS, it continues to oppose Indian standpoint in several cases (e.g., the NSG membership 
bid). The Chinese response is a function of its rising economic stature (e.g., the rising growth 
rate, exports) and declining dependence on the ‘west’. Consequently, India has been able to 
come closer to the other ‘East’ Asian countries given the shared economic complementarities, 
growing production integration and the perceived urge to counter the security threats posed by 
the recent Chinese policies. China’s reluctance to abide by the verdict of the international 
tribunal in The Hague against its building of artificial islands in disputed waters of the South 
China Sea (The Guardian, 2016), threaten the security of several ASEAN countries. The land 
and sea border disputes involving China concerns India and quite a few Asian countries (e.g., 
Vietnam, Japan, South Korea). There exist enough common ground for these countries to 
cooperate with India on strategic platform, which the economic cooperation initiatives can 
further strengthen. The Indian Prime Minister’s recent visits to various Asian countries (e.g., 
Mongolia, Vietnam) and the key agreements therein take note of this strategic need.   
 
In this backdrop, the ongoing economic cooperation agreement, i.e., RCEP can play a 
constructive role in reducing the political differences across the Asian countries. It has been 
noted that, American and Chinese hegemony is playing a crucial role in denying entry to each 
other at Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and RCEP respectively (Hamanaka, 2014). In other 
words, China has a strong desire in securing the success of the RCEP, which may lock-in 
institutional and political reforms. Given the recent reluctance of the US to proceed on the TPP 
front, RCEP has become all the more crucial for the Asian players, particularly China (Sink and 
Olorunnipa, 2017). Nevertheless, the aggressive economic strategy of China has caused India 
and other economies to move cautiously, which can be observed from the number of anti-
dumping investigations initiated by Asian partners against the ‘dragon’ (Chaisse and 
Chakraborty, 2016b). India needs to urgently consolidate the competitiveness of the domestic 
players, so that inception of RCEP do not end up hurting its interests. Keeping this perspective in 
mind, the economic initiatives of the NDA government like ‘Make in India’ and ‘Skill India’ are 
the appropriate steps in that direction.  
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Table 1: India’s Trade Scenario with Select ‘East’ Asian Countries (2001-2014) in US $ Million 
 
Partner Name 
Export Import Trade Balance 
2001-05 2006-10 2011-14 2001-05 2006-10 2011-14 2001-05 2006-10 2011-14 
Australia 586.26 1275.62 2430.13 2615.17 9566.07 11788.02 -2028.91 -8290.45 -9357.89 
China 3260.72 11045.02 15324.54 4856.17 28732.67 54872.37 -1595.45 -17687.65 -39547.82 
Hong Kong, China 3189.71 6751.56 12901.24 1336.59 4671.40 8329.88 1853.12 2080.16 4571.36 
Indonesia 976.33 2793.48 5606.22 1911.30 6435.42 14550.48 -934.97 -3641.94 -8944.26 
Japan 1870.18 3542.52 6272.63 2580.31 6662.93 11008.76 -710.13 -3120.40 -4736.13 
Korea, Democratic People's 
Republic of (North Korea)  139.37 518.91 179.61 3.91 181.32 48.85 135.46 337.59 130.77 
Korea, Republic of (South Korea) 846.68 3192.91 4479.16 2515.69 7366.46 12975.37 -1669.01 -4173.56 -8496.21 
Macao, China 2.57 10.74 1.33 3.37 0.26 1.63 -0.80 10.49 -0.30 
Malaysia 901.60 2659.21 4432.27 1805.52 5765.81 9964.89 -903.93 -3106.60 -5532.62 
Mongolia 0.98 9.61 21.23 0.34 6.82 12.08 0.65 2.79 9.15 
New Zealand 87.81 253.54 290.20 107.82 422.22 678.31 -20.01 -168.68 -388.11 
Philippines 373.69 684.44 1257.96 141.29 269.47 438.49 232.39 414.97 819.47 
Singapore 2570.46 7453.00 13261.46 2041.41 6759.14 7512.17 529.06 693.86 5749.29 
Taipei, Chinese 525.39 1548.77 2717.58 851.12 2537.32 4438.73 -325.73 -988.55 -1721.16 
Thailand 797.47 1776.00 3466.10 655.14 2624.93 5427.80 142.33 -848.94 -1961.71 
ASEAN 6145.64 17296.85 33993.1 7004.34 23527.68 42459.05 -858.69 -6230.83 -8465.96 
Source: Constructed by authors from Trade Map database (undated) 
 
 
Table 2: Trade Complementarity Index for India with Select East Asian Countries 
 
Partner India Export – Partner Import India Import –Partner Export 
2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 
Australia 50.19 56.99 57.54 52.97 55.41 55.51 
China 48.86 52.47 49.68 40.05 37.98 43.53 
Hong Kong, China 57.45 57.10 58.34 60.87 59.51 66.83 
Japan 53.57 62.50 60.67 40.15 41.37 47.22 
North Korea 78.85 52.14 54.52 75.54 75.27 69.90 
South Korea 49.52 58.51 55.56 44.44 44.24 48.72 
Macao, China 66.30 76.26 77.20 43.01 59.03 57.38 
Malaysia 44.52 50.59 55.22 49.84 51.45 58.85 
Mongolia 65.48 66.06 70.23 37.26 53.73 55.15 
New Zealand 49.46 57.75 55.44 29.83 29.83 26.91 
Singapore 40.48 48.34 46.91 47.89 52.89 53.72 
Taipei, Chinese 61.01 66.35 66.26 64.63 63.44 65.79 
Thailand 53.54 62.62 58.91 43.30 44.41 47.84 
Source: Calculated by authors from Trade Map (undated) data 
 
Table 3: Trade Intensity and Intra-Industry Trade Index of India with Select East Asian 
Countries 
 
Partner Trade Intensity Index Intra-Industry Trade 
2005 2010 2015 2005 2010 2015 
Australia 2.15 1.84 1.62 11.70 11.52 5.92 
China 0.92 1.02 0.92 12.40 11.49 27.66 
Hong Kong, China 1.48 1.62 1.20 63.03 78.66 42.59 
Japan 0.50 0.49 0.55 13.56 15.32 26.29 
North Korea - - - 19.37 5.23 8.77 
South Korea 0.97 0.82 0.84 19.47 30.64 39.95 
Macao, China - - - 10.79 4.98 0.11 
Malaysia 1.10 1.16 1.41 20.15 19.66 24.07 
Mongolia 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.09 
New Zealand 0.63 0.75 0.59 4.07 7.69 3.60 
Singapore 2.20 1.75 1.32 21.00 52.27 33.42 
Taipei, Chinese 0.41 0.55 0.40 20.40 13.47 19.15 
Thailand 0.85 0.86 0.96 19.77 31.96 32.18 
Source: Obtained from ADB ARIC (undated) and calculated by authors from Trade Map (undated) data 
respectively 
Table 4: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
(in per cent) 
 
Source Country Exporting Countries 
2000 2011 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China 61.41 0.40 0.61 1.98 67.48 2.79 1.89 5.77 
Hong Kong, 
China  
1.36 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.39 0.18 0.09 0.25 
India 0.25 75.33 0.06 0.24 0.78 59.78 0.23 0.94 
Japan 7.83 0.74 88.81 7.14 2.87 1.21 78.49 6.33 
South Korea 2.59 0.31 0.41 65.15 1.20 0.73 1.02 49.72 
New Zealand 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.12 
Taipei, Chinese  2.51 0.12 0.23 0.41 0.58 0.32 0.30 0.48 
APEC 85.47 5.18 94.55 85.91 83.14 13.66 90.06 77.33 
ASEAN 2.27 0.70 1.22 2.34 2.21 2.22 2.75 3.88 
EU 28 5.12 4.95 1.25 3.73 4.15 5.27 1.61 4.05 
USA 3.00 1.22 1.10 2.91 1.72 1.76 1.13 2.54 
OECD Members 21.95 9.37 93.32 84.06 15.40 13.05 85.63 69.32 
Source: Constructed by authors from OECD TIVA (undated) data 
 
Table 5: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 
(in per cent) 
 
Source Country Exporting Countries 
2000 2011 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China 22.56 0.40 0.52 1.10 45.01 5.10 3.95 7.71 
Hong Kong, 
China  
1.93 0.17 
0.09 0.23 
0.84 0.26 
0.11 0.26 
India 0.27 78.79 0.05 0.16 0.78 68.81 0.20 0.56 
Japan 20.99 0.95 89.84 11.14 10.62 1.81 82.82 7.33 
South Korea 6.05 0.36 0.79 62.52 6.35 1.12 0.99 57.77 
New Zealand 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.07 
Taipei, Chinese  6.89 0.18 0.88 2.04 5.44 0.72 0.77 2.20 
APEC 78.42 5.62 96.80 91.16 83.38 16.59 94.41 87.18 
ASEAN 5.84 0.82 1.33 3.42 6.36 2.68 1.92 3.93 
EU 28 16.23 5.14 1.77 4.84 9.03 6.27 2.28 5.64 
USA 10.59 1.36 2.66 8.97 5.51 2.89 2.31 5.21 
OECD Members 57.98 9.88 95.95 89.66 35.52 14.52 90.03 78.97 
Source: Constructed by authors from OECD TIVA (undated) data 
Table 6: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Electrical machinery and apparatus 
(in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 2011 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China 31.80 0.38 0.47 1.20 51.38 3.52 3.24 6.58 
Hong Kong, 
China  2.22 0.16 0.08 0.27 0.74 0.21 0.10 0.24 
India 0.34 80.51 0.04 0.48 1.04 66.04 0.20 0.93 
Japan 15.23 0.86 92.51 7.20 7.98 1.39 84.49 5.76 
South Korea 4.99 0.33 0.45 73.08 3.68 0.89 0.86 61.71 
New Zealand 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.09 
Taipei, 
Chinese  5.17 0.16 0.42 0.90 1.87 0.40 0.42 0.75 
APEC 77.25 5.19 97.22 91.32 79.44 14.11 94.50 85.33 
ASEAN 4.07 0.74 0.91 1.97 3.75 2.08 2.01 2.84 
EU 28 13.15 4.82 1.35 4.92 10.49 6.09 2.09 5.01 
USA 7.23 1.31 1.62 5.05 3.96 2.29 1.65 3.33 
OECD 
Members 45.94 9.20 96.72 92.23 31.83 13.87 90.66 79.63 
Source: Constructed by authors from OECD TIVA (undated) data 
 
Table 7: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Textiles, textile products, leather and 
footwear (in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 2011 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China 61.82 0.32 3.24 2.91 73.52 2.57 9.88 6.29 
Hong Kong, 
China  1.45 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.65 0.22 0.12 0.25 
India 0.55 90.40 0.14 0.68 0.86 80.17 0.37 0.82 
Japan 7.26 0.30 88.72 3.35 2.62 0.65 76.03 3.64 
South Korea 6.47 0.24 0.82 76.06 2.08 0.49 0.72 64.66 
New Zealand 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.09 
Taipei, 
Chinese  4.91 0.15 0.38 0.62 1.27 0.29 0.38 0.62 
APEC 90.21 2.97 96.28 90.15 87.93 9.51 92.55 85.59 
ASEAN 2.27 0.53 0.95 2.04 2.49 1.73 2.05 3.32 
EU 28 4.85 1.96 2.20 3.89 4.72 3.99 3.28 4.64 
USA 3.78 0.72 1.56 3.41 2.82 2.14 1.86 3.38 
OECD 
Members 24.61 4.00 93.94 88.41 14.63 8.91 83.43 79.49 
Source: Constructed by authors from OECD TIVA (undated) data 
Table 8: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Transport Equipment Sector (in per cent) 
 
Source 
Country 
Exporting Countries 
2000 2011 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China India Japan South 
Korea 
China 57.38 0.40 0.43 1.24 70.03 3.67 2.37 5.70 
Hong Kong, 
China  1.16 0.18 0.08 0.19 0.38 0.21 0.10 0.20 
India 0.18 80.81 0.04 0.24 0.52 68.00 0.18 0.68 
Japan 10.18 1.04 91.72 7.45 5.16 1.49 85.77 6.27 
South Korea 2.48 0.32 0.41 70.97 2.01 0.99 0.65 62.04 
New Zealand 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 
Taipei, 
Chinese  2.92 0.14 0.38 0.68 0.96 0.35 0.35 0.65 
APEC 84.95 5.72 96.53 90.33 86.27 13.89 94.17 84.89 
ASEAN 2.05 0.71 0.80 1.92 1.89 1.98 1.69 2.49 
EU 28 9.76 4.52 2.08 4.52 7.94 6.38 2.57 6.39 
USA  5.56 1.75 1.98 5.00 2.77 2.41 1.66 3.81 
OECD 
Members 31.03 9.33 96.98 90.87 20.86 14.19 92.10 82.02 
Source: Constructed by authors from OECD TIVA (undated) data 
 
 
 
 
 
